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Oral/Written Contrast of Mental State References in Older Children
Jeanne E. Federico
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study was to determine differences in the use of mental state
references by typically developing 9- and 11-year-old children. Following a priming task
that emphasized distinctions between physical and mental acts, children watched an 11minute textless video and then were asked to generate an oral and a written story that
focused on the mental states of the multiple characters. Narratives were transcribed, and
all mental state references were classified into motivational, experiential, and belief
categories. Specific mental state references were also analyzed to determine levels of
semantic complexity. The study attempted to answer: 1) whether 9- and 11-year-old
typically developing children differed in their ability to use more complex mental state
references and 2) whether this ability varied as a function of the oral versus the written
modality.
The sample consisted of 26 children, ages 9;0-9;11 (15 females, 11 males), and 24
children, ages 11;00-11;11 (14 females, 10 males). The total sample (N=50) consisted of
32 Caucasian children, 15 African-American children, 2 Hispanic children, and 1 AsianAmerican. All children were selected from one urban elementary school located in West
Central Florida, were from monolingual, English-speaking homes, and were speakers of
Standard American English.

v

A statistical analysis was conducted via a 3-way MANOVA, specifically, 2 (age 9
vs. age 11) x 4 (mental state categories) x 2 (oral versus written modality). In addition, a
qualitative analysis was completed to compare the frequency, complexity, and lexical
depth of different types of mental state verbs produced in the oral and written narratives.
Results revealed an unexpected lack of variability in age in the production of
mental state references, possibly due to the close age interval of participants. However,
there was substantial variability in production across the three mental state categories for
both age groups. Across the two modalities, results provided evidence for increasing
lexical diversity, complexity, and depth in the production of mental state references by
the older children, especially for belief verbs. Future research directions are presented to
investigate relationships between more advanced theory of mind development and the
lexical depth of mental state references.
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Chapter 1
Literature Review, Purpose, and Research Questions
In the last 15 years, children’s development of a theory of mind has become an
important research area, including how theory of mind relates to autism spectrum
disorder (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1995; Happe, 1994, 1995; Silliman et al., 2003). Simply put,
theory of mind is an understanding of the mind of self and others as an active agent.
Arriving at some sort of understanding of the mind is an important accomplishment for
children, because it is central to understanding the social world. Children learn that
internal mental states, such as beliefs and desires, influence the actions of themselves and
others. They learn to differentiate between intended and accidental behavior, between
wishes and reality, and between truth and deception. A concept of mind leads to
understanding human behavior, which is an important tool for navigating the intricacies
of human communication, including the language of schooling.
Theory of mind is often described as the understanding of one’s own and others’
mental states, such as thinking and knowing (German & Leslie, 2000). It is also described
as awareness of one’s own and others’ emotions, desires, and intentions (Astington,
2001). This mental landscape, which Bruner (1986) calls the “landscape of
consciousness,” gives meaning to actions and events. To assign meaning to the actions of
others, children must consider the mental processes involved. When children become
aware of this mentalism, they have acquired a basic theory of mind. Beyond a basic
framework of theory of mind, children also develop more specific conceptual structures
and more complex levels of meaning for cognitive processes over the course of their
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development (Booth & Hall, 1995; Wellman, 1990). In effect, theory of mind is how
children think about thinking.
Most studies on children’s development of theory of mind have concentrated on
the preschool and early elementary age years. In addition, few studies have examined
changes in the complexity of children’s use of mental state references that denote the
understanding of motivation, actions, and beliefs. Finally, most studies concerned with
mental state references have focused on children’s performance in the oral domain, with
minimal attention paid to how the modality of expression (oral versus written) affects the
complexity of mental state terms.
This review of the literature is organized to address the relationship between
theory of mind development and children’s developing use of mental state references.
The first section presents a general overview of theory of mind frameworks, specifically
two theoretical perspectives that attempt to account for development of a theory of mind.
The social and academic relevance of a theory of mind is also addressed. In the next
section, the linguistic aspect of theory of mind is discussed, focusing on the relationship
of mental state referencing to theory of mind development. Earlier phases of development
are contrasted with more advanced phases with an emphasis on cognitive verbs that
express ways of knowing. The limited research on mental state development as assessed
through writing is also overviewed, including the few studies with children having a
language learning disability (LLD). The final section presents the purpose of this study,
which investigates similarities and differences in the mental state referencing of 9-and11-year children in an oral-written contrast paradigm.
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Theory of Mind: A General Overview
Theory of mind is necessary in order to have a psychological concept of others
(Wellman, Phillips, & Rodriguez, 2000). In other words, theory of mind allows one to see
people in terms of their psychological states, in addition to their physical entities. It is the
tool by which children attribute mental states to people, such as their thoughts, desires,
beliefs, and intentions. Most critically, a well-developed concept of mind leads to the
understanding that people are motivated by their desires, intentions, beliefs, and emotions
(Wellman, 1990). Additionally, children with advancing concepts of mind develop the
insight that their own or another person’s beliefs may not be true, and that a person can
have a false belief (Astington, Harris, & Olson, 1988). As a result, children’s theory of
mind underlies their understanding of human behavior.
There are two major contrasting views of theory of mind development in children,
the constructivist, or theory-theory, model and the modularity, or mechanism, view. The
constructivist, or theory-theory, model suggests that children acquire knowledge about
the mind between the ages of 2 and 5 years old by means of actively constructing and
refining a “scientific theory” about mental states. The modularity, or mechanism, view
purports that children are born with an innate mechanism, or specialized module, that
leads to the development of theory of mind. Each of these mentalistic theories is
reviewed briefly.
The Theory-Theory View
Gopnik and Wellman (1982) proposed that children’s understanding of mental
states developed through a process of theory construction and modification. Children
develop theories about the mind and use these theories to explain human behavior.

3

Others, such as Astington (1998a), view this process similarly. From ages 2 to 5 years,
children develop concepts of how things and people work. To understand another
person’s behavior, children must become aware of the fact that people act based on their
thoughts, desires, and feelings. Children must become aware of this mental processing
before they can interpret the behavior of other people.
In a similar theory-theory vein, Perner (1995) considers theory of mind
acquisition as an important intellectual change that begins around 4 years of age, when
children usually master an explicit concept of false belief. This explicit understanding,
whereby children predict what a character will do based on specific knowledge of the
character’s false belief, is typically assessed with a task that involves a displaced object
scenario. For example, Wimmer and Perner (1983) developed the Maxi task in which the
character, Maxi, places a piece of chocolate in the kitchen cupboard and leaves the room
to play. While Maxi is out of the room, his mother moves the chocolate from the
cupboard to a drawer. The child is then asked where Maxi will look for the chocolate
when he returns. The correct response (“in the drawer”) depends on the child’s ability to
understand that Maxi’s behavior depends on his beliefs about object location rather than
on the real situation (the displaced object). In other words, relative to the formation of an
initial or first order concept of mind (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995), the child must be able
to predict that, in this kind of situation, another can accept a false belief as true. Perner
(1995) refers to this insight as the “understanding of aboutness,” or the realization that a
proposition is about a world, whether real or pretend, and must be evaluated against that
world in order to determine if it is true or false. For example, when presented with the
statement “Maxi believes that the chocolate is in the original cupboard,” the proposition
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“the chocolate is in the original cupboard” must be evaluated against Maxi’s world in
order for the child to determine if Maxi’s belief is true or false. One speculation is that
children acquire this primary knowledge about the contents of others’ minds through an
ongoing process of conceptual discovery.
The Modularity View
A competing theory is the modularity view. For example, German and Leslie
(2000) reject the theory-theory view and, instead, propose a mechanism, or modular,
view, which is borrowed from the “big modularity” strand of generative linguistics. A
module is designed for the specialized processing of an input, in this case, the cognitive
processing of the mind’s contents.
Fodor’s (1981, cited in de Villiers, 2003, p. 428) concept of modularity is that,
“processing is fast, mandatory, not accessible to introspection, and most importantly,
encapsulated (i.e., impervious to the influence of general knowledge or other cognitive
processes)”. In terms of a theory of mind module, the speculation is that children are born
with innate concepts that allow them to attend to mental states (German & Leslie, 2000).
These specialized attentional mechanisms then allow learning about mental states to take
place. The ability to attend to beliefs becomes more flexible over time and thereby
increases success with false belief problems. Eventually, children develop competent
reasoning skills when assessing mental states. The modularity concept has been seriously
criticized, most recently by Thelen and Bates (2003), who make the case that modularity
is not a developmental theory about how mind and language emerge continuously over
time. Instead, modularity is a biologically deterministic view that fails to explain
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adequately cognitive or language development, much less individual differences in
developmental trajectories.
Regardless of the theoretical perspective, it appears that, at least for Western
cultures, middle-class children typically develop a concept of mind at about the same
time. Wellman, Cross, and Watson (2001) conducted a meta-analysis of 178 separate
child studies on theory-of-mind development. Their findings indicated that children’s
understanding of belief, and, therefore, their understanding of the mind, underwent great
conceptual change in the preschool years. Wellman et al. (2001) also argued against early
competence explanations, claiming, as do German and Leslie (2001), that apparent basic
theory of mind development between the ages of 3 and 5 years of age is masked by
overly difficult tasks variables. Rather, Wellman et al. found that the development of
these insights was consistently evident across different tasks and different Western
cultures, suggesting that such a conception of the mind’s contents is a natural and
universal way for children to understand people’s intentions and actions.
From a social interactional perspective, little is known about the contribution of
variations in family socialization practices to individual differences in theory of mind
development (Lillard, 1998). However, there is some information about the relevance of
a well-integrated theory of mind for social and academic success.
Social and Academic Relevance of a Theory of Mind
Social interaction is dependent on theory of mind because children’s social lives
depend on perspective taking or the shared reciprocity of thoughts, desires, feelings, and
plans. For example, Gopnik and Astington (1988) see social relevance in the ability of
children to attribute false beliefs to themselves and others because this ability is
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necessary to understand what drives the otherwise incomprehensible behavior of another
person. These authors believe that children actually learn to understand changes in their
own mental states through evaluation of differences between their own mental states and
those of others. To illustrate, it may be difficult for children to examine their own
contradictions, but it is not so easy to overlook contrary claims imposed by an older
sibling.
Moreover, how children “think about thinking and communicating” even affects
their critical thinking skills and, therefore, their success in school in a variety of content
areas (Astington, 1998b). Critical thinking depends on the ability to consider one’s own
beliefs, recognize one’s false beliefs, and take another’s perspective, including authors’
perspectives. When children are exposed to literature during their school-age years,
development of perspective taking is a necessary element in order to understand the
intentions of characters and historical actions of individuals. The ability to coordinate the
multiple perspectives of several characters in a book is speculated as leading to
successful reading comprehension (Donahue & Foster, 2004). Development of
perspective taking also leads to the evolving social competence that contributes to
academic success (Astington, 2003).
In sum, theory of mind and perspective taking are intertwined, as both are central
to achieving the shared community of minds that characterizes the understanding of one’s
self and others (Nelson, 2004). Because communication is “social interaction that
activates mental processes of perspective taking” (MacWhinney, in press, p. 27),
perspective taking and shifting are central to communication. Therefore, there is evidence
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that an increasingly coordinated theory of mind is essential for children’s successful
cognitive, social, and language development.
An important question concerns the role of language in theory of mind
development. The majority of research on linkages has concentrated on the contributions
of syntactic development to perspective taking. Less work has examined the semantic
domain, specifically, the development and elaboration of mental state references.
The Language Connection to Theory of Mind Development
Direction of the Relationship
An initial study on theory of mind-language connections was conducted by
Bretherton and Beeghly (1982). A total of 30 middle-class mothers and their children.
were seen at home and in laboratory sessions at 10, 13, 20, and 28 months of age. The
mothers were asked to listen to the child’s speech and to note the use of 73 internal-state
words, divided into categories of perception, physiology, affect, volition/ability,
cognition, and moral judgment/obligation. Findings led to the interpretation that young
children’s mental state development and language development were interrelated,
emerging with the onset of communicative intentions.
A second perspective is that language competence leads to theory of mind
development. For example, based on their study of children from 8- to 11-years-old,
Astington and Jenkins (1999) argued that children’s theory of mind development was
predicted by their general syntactic competence. Astington (2001) also stressed the
importance of language in the development of false-belief understanding. She stated that
false belief is central to theory-of-mind development, due to the fact that it is a strong
indicator of mentalistic understanding.
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A third perspective is that theory of mind development is made public through
language, and children’s everyday conversations demonstrate their awareness of other
people’s mental states (Wellman et al., 2000). However, this public display should not be
confused with language as the generator of conceptual change in theory of mind
development. Wellman et al. (2001) argued that changes in the conceptual knowledge
base drive the language of beliefs and false beliefs rather than linguistic elements, such as
the ability to produce “tensed complements,” serving as a bootstrap for beliefs about the
mind. de Villiers and de Villiers (2000) made the opposite case. Because sentences with
mental state verbs often require complements, children must possess the ability to engage
in false complement processing, such as the processing of ”Dad thought that he forgot the
birthday present (when the child knows he did not forget)” (Silliman et al., 2003, p. 239)
before they can provide an adequate mental explanation for two contradictory
perspectives.
Regardless of the perspective taken, children’s use of mental state references
provides a fairly reliable indicator of their level of theory of mind development. Children
begin to demonstrate acquisition of a theory of mind around age 2 years, as evidenced by
their use of mental state references indicating their own desires (e.g., “want”). They
continue to demonstrate theory of mind development throughout the school-age years, as
evidenced by an increasingly varied and complex vocabulary of mental state references.
Semantic Development of Mental States Meanings
Early development. Bartsch and Wellman (1995) acknowledge that, when
children learn to talk, their conversations provide a window into their understanding of
people’s minds. Although individual children will differ in their onset of referring to
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mental states, Bartsch and Wellman found that children’s talk about the mind developed
in three phases. The earliest phase begins around the age of 2 years, when very young
children talk about desires, mainly wants and likes, in many different contexts, such as
their desires for objects and actions. Even 2-year-olds do not limit the expression of
desires to items, such as toys and food. Their desire expressions also include action (e.g.,
the desire to run) and changes in state (e.g., the desire to be asleep).
The second phase, beginning around the age of 3 years, occurs when children
begin to talk about thoughts and beliefs, as well as desires. Even when children first
begin to talk about these more cognitive concepts, Bartsch and Wellman (1995) found
that their mental state expressions were not confined to talking of thoughts alone, whether
real or imaginary. They also talked about beliefs (a thought that something is so) and
false beliefs (a thought that something is so, when it is not). However, children in this
phase continue to talk about desires more frequently than thoughts and beliefs, and,
typically, their explanations for a person’s actions are based on their interpretation of a
person’s desires.
In the third phase, beginning around the age of 4 years, thoughts and beliefs begin
to play a larger role in children’s understanding of relationships between the intentions
and actions of others (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995). They refer more often to thoughts and
beliefs (e.g., “think,” “know”), and they take in account a person’s beliefs, both true and
false, to explain their actions. In this phase, children appear to understand that people not
only have thoughts and beliefs, but also that thoughts and beliefs are important elements
in explaining why people do things. For example, children understand that people’s
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desires are shaped by their beliefs, and that false beliefs, rather than the reality of a
situation, can determine a person’s actions.
Bretherton and Beeghly (1982) also found that an emerging ability to attribute
internal states to one’s self and others becomes evident with the onset of communicative
intention. Based on their naturalistically obtained data, they discovered that children
begin to speak about mental states late in their second year, and that this skill becomes
more fully developed in the third year. Although the children in their study tended to
speak of their own mental states before those of other people, only a small minority of
mental state words were produced that referred exclusively to themselves. In fact, the
results indicated that 2-year-old children interpreted their own and other people’s mental
states, commented on their own or others’ expected or past experiences, and discussed
how their own or another person’s mental state came about or might be changed. Threeyear-old children demonstrated the ability to analyze the goals and motives of others, as
these related to the child’s own goals and motives.
Astington (1999) also found that children begin to express mental states almost as
soon as they begin to talk. Children used words to anticipate and describe their own and
others’ actions. They also produced references like will and gonna to refer to their own
and others’ future actions. According to Astington, children’s acquisition of these
references leads to their developing understanding of intention, which then influences and
increases their understanding of intentionality. Moreover, Jenkins and Astington (1996)
found a strong positive correlation between false-belief understanding and general
syntactic ability in children between 2 years 11 months and 5 years 5 months.
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While middle-class preschool age children are capable of talking about mental
states and generally use the mental state references that are used most often in the home
(Jenkins, Turrell, Kogushi, Lollis, & Ross, 2003; Meins et al., 2002; Ruffman, Slade, &
Crowe, 2002), certain categories of mental state verbs appear to be more cognitively and
semantically complex for young children (Nixon, 2005). For example, Nixon found that
mental state verbs encoding degrees of certainty (e.g., know) were easier for 4 year olds
to produce than mental state verbs encoding degrees of uncertainty, such as wish, think,
and consider. Nixon (2005) concluded that whether or not verbs referring to the certaintyuncertainty continuum were used depended on “their inherent semantic, cognitive, and
syntactic complexity (p. 35).”
Later development of a theory of mind. Wellman (1990) found evidence of
additional development of theory of mind in the years beyond age 6 years. Children get
progressively better at considering other people’s thinking. Their proficiency at
identifying other people’s beliefs and desires increases, as well as the ability to predict
and explain others’ actions on the basis of their beliefs and desires. They move from a
more concrete level to a more inferential level of interpretation of the actions of others.
For example, younger children see themselves and others in concrete categories such as
their address and physical appearance, while adolescents use more abstract descriptions
such as personal beliefs and motivation. In addition, there is a substantial developmental
change after age 7 years in the use of trait explanations to justify the actions of
themselves and others (e.g., “he’s stubborn,” “she’s shy”). During this time, children also
develop a stronger and more insightful self-concept, which includes the concept that
one’s “self” is reflected by one’s mind. Wellman (1990) believed that each phase of
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theory of mind development built on the achievements of the previous phase, and that
more complex development of a theory of mind is probable beyond age 6 years.
Older children also become better at implicitly understanding the concept of
someone thinking about thinking, specifically, when others’ false beliefs are not
explicitly stated. Perner and Wimmer (1985) identified this further development in
conception as the acquisition of second-order beliefs, and Flavell (1999) called it
metacognition, which includes “knowledge about the nature of people as cognizers” (p.
21).
Later development of mental state references. Despite Wellman’s (1990)
prediction that theory of mind development becomes more sophisticated after the age of 6
years, there have been few studies investigating advances. Similarly, children’s
increasingly sophisticated development of mental state references during the school-age
years has not been pursued in other than a limited way, an important omission given
Nixon’s (2005) findings that the production of particular kinds of mental state verbs are
influenced by their semantic and cognitive complexity. Two studies involving older
children are of interest here.
One study, conducted by Schwanenflugel, Fabricius, and Noyes (1996), examined
the continuing development of theory of mind in 8 to 11 year old children through their
changes in the organization of cognitive or mental state verbs of knowing, such as
thinking, guessing, and knowing. Results indicated that older children constructed a
semantic organization of mental verbs according to the certainty aspects of mental
processes, and that this semantic organization became more complex and fine-tuned with
further development. Older children and adults were remarkably similar in their semantic
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organization of these verbs, and, consistent with Nixon’s (2005) results with 4 year olds,
older children placed greater emphasis on the certainty aspects of mental activity, as
evidenced by their increased understanding of the mental state verbs know, think, and
guess. For example, “know,” “think,” and “remember” were ordered as more certain than
“guess,” “estimate,” and “compare.” In contrast, preschool-age children demonstrated a
more absolute, or “true/false,” view of certainty. Schwanenflugel et al. (1996) speculated
that the conceptual and semantic knowledge of older children evolved to a “degrees of
certainty” perspective due to subjectively experienced feelings of uncertainty. The more
that children have experiences with uncertainty, the more that they come to understand
this concept as relative.
The second study was conducted by Booth and Hall (1995), who also investigated
the understanding of the cognitive verb know in 3-, 6-, 9-, and 12-year-olds. Booth and
Hall compared younger and older children’s understanding of six different levels of
meaning of the cognitive verb know: 1. Perception (e.g. “I heard your story”); 2.
Recognition (e.g., “I know that face”); 3. Recall (e.g., “I know his phone number”); 4.
Understanding (e.g., “I know why he did that”); 5. Metacognition (e.g., “Pretending can
be fun”); and 6. Evaluation (e.g., “He guessed the answer, but I know it”). Children were
presented video-taped skits involving interactions between two hand-held puppets in one
scenario and audio-taped stories in another scenario. The skits and stories required
answers for the six levels of meaning for the cognitive know.
Results showed that the depth of children’s knowledge about the multiple
meanings of know increased with age due to conceptual reorganization. For example,
hierarchical knowledge of the cognitive verb know became more differentiated with
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development, with 3-year-olds having the most restricted levels of meanings and 12-yearolds having the most flexible levels of meaning. Younger children encountered difficulty
differentiating between mental acts, such as knowing, and physical acts, such as doing. In
contrast, older children realized that to know something, one had to mentally manipulate
information. Consistent with these patterns, 3-year-olds exhibited understanding of the
least number of levels of meaning, 6- and 9-year-olds demonstrated understanding of a
moderate number of levels of meaning, and 12-year-olds had the most distinctions among
the six levels of meaning. This pattern resulted in a more differentiated and hierarchical
mental state verb lexicon in older children.
Developmental Continuum: Oral-Literate Contrasts
Children develop language skills over an oral-literate continuum. They
continually add new vocabulary words and apply new language concepts (e.g., semantic,
syntactic, and pragmatic concepts) to their oral language knowledge, and they initially
write like they talk. However, during the early school years, features of oral and written
language converge – “write like talk” combines with “talk like books” (Rubin, 1987).
Beginning around age 9 years, writing becomes increasingly differentiated from
speaking, with more complex forms of language expressed in writing than in speech
(Scott, 1999).
Similarly, children’s mental state references appear to emerge over a general
developmental continuum. Based on the literature, motivational references (e.g., “want”)
appear first, experiential references (e.g., “see”) appear next, and belief references that
index degrees of uncertainty (e.g., “think) appear last. In addition, these mental state
references demonstrate greater lexical depth over time in the evolution of related and
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unrelated meanings (Nixon, 2005). For example, a child may say, “I see a dog” at age 3
years and “I see what you mean” at age 10 years.
McGregor (2004) refers to this process of increasing lexical depth as “slow
mapping.” Children develop initial “maps” of word meanings. This process is known as
“fast mapping,” or incidental learning, based on children’s implicit exposure to a
multitude of word meanings. With multiple experiences with these meanings over time,
including the critical influences of reading and writing, children continue to refine those
meanings. One slow mapping process that McGregor (2004) describes is semantic
elaboration, which allows words to assume multiple meanings (e.g., dogs bark, but bark
also grows on trees). A second slow mapping process is the development of a
categorically organized semantic network, which affords greater ease in lexical access
because meanings are related in a superordinate-subordinate structure. Figure 1 displays
this continuum of development for mental state categories in their scope or breadth and
depth.
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Figure 1. Proposed developmental continuum with examples for three categories of
mental state references in terms of their lexical breadth and depth

Lexical Breadth

Lexical Depth

Motivational
References

Experiential
References

Belief
References

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

want

•

look, see, heard

•

think

tried

•

mad, sad

•

notice

said

•

found

•

guess

had to X

•

stared

•

decide

meant to X

•

disgusted

•

realize

•

aggravated

Despite the growing interest in the semantic development of school-age children,
only three studies have explicitly used the oral-written contrast design. Two
investigations, Scott and Windsor (2000) and Fey, Catts, Proctor-Williams, Tomblin, and
Zhang (2004), employed methodology in which children’s oral narratives were contrasted
with their written narratives. Scott and Windsor (2000) assessed the general language
performance of school-age children with and without language learning disabilities
through spoken and written narratives. The primary focus was morphosyntactic integrity
of inflectional morphemes. Fey et al. (2004) also compared the oral and written narratives
of typically developing children and children with language impairment for lexical and
grammatical complexity, in addition to story content, organization, and overall quality.
As previously noted, mental state references in either oral or written narratives were not
examined in either study.
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Only a Swedish study of children, adolescents, and young adults, ages 9, 12, 15,
and 20 years (Nordqvist, 2001) explicitly examined patterns of mental state verb
production in oral and written narratives. A wordless picture book frequently used in
cross-linguistic research on narratives served as the elicitation method for both the oral
and written modes. Nordqvist established two categories of cognitive verbs. The first was
cognitive verbs having a syntactic framing, or complementizer, function, e.g., “The boy
thought that the frog was lonely.” The second category included four types of verbs that
did not have the complement, or syntactic framing, function: a) those that expressed
motivation (such as “intends”); b) those that conveyed reflection, as in “She is thinking
about the frog” or “They wondered about the frog”; c) those that communicated
experiences , like “The boy thinks he hears something”; and d) those that expressed
having an opinion or belief, such as “He thinks the frog is lost.” All four age groups
produced a greater number of non-framing verbs. In addition, a general trend for the three
oldest age groups was that all cognitive verbs were “expressed to a greater extent in
writing than in speaking” (Nordqvist, 2001, p. 263).
In general, a small number of cognitive verbs were generated across age groups
(N =132; n = 53 spoken, n = 79 written). Three variables may have influenced the
frequency of cognitive verb production, whether framed or unframed. The first is the
relatively small sample size of each group (N = 15). Second, a wordless picture book
designed for younger children may not be as appealing to older children, adolescents, and
young adults. Finally, the instructions to the participants did not emphasize cognitive
states. Participants were informed only to look first through the picture book and “Then
tell what is happening in the pictures” (Nordqvist, 2001, p. 120).
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Summary
As noted earlier, the majority of previous studies on theory of mind development
have focused on children from ages 2 to 5 years. The first studies of theory of mind
investigated development in young children. Leslie (1987) found that children typically
engage in pretend play by two years of age, adopting the perspectives of other people or
characters. Around 2 ½ years of age, most children use the mental state terms of “want”
and “know” in everyday speech (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995). By age 3 years, children
have developed some concept of desires and intentions (Wellman, 1990). Between the
ages of 2 ½ and 4 years, children begin to reason about other people’s beliefs, can predict
or explain actions based on false beliefs, and can actively deceive other people (Bartsch
& Wellman, 1995).
Most recent studies have consisted mainly of two types of tasks: false belief tasks
and tasks eliciting the use of mental state verbs. These studies have focused on young
children’s awareness that someone can have a false belief (Astington & Jenkins, 1999)
and their understanding of mental states as evidenced by their use of mental state verbs,
such as “think” and “know” (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995). Mental state verbs are evidence
of children’s awareness of multiple perspectives, indicating other people’s states of mind
and emotions (Dunn, 1999), other people’s intentions and desires (Wellman et al., 2000),
and other people’s knowledge, perceptions, and beliefs (Schwanenflugel et al., 1996).
Minimal research has examined the knowledge and organization of specific
mental state verbs in preadolescents, such as think, know, and guess (Booth & Hall, 1995;
Nordqvist, 2001; Schwanenflugel et al., 1996). Evidence of more complex use of these
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belief references over time would suggest the continued development of a theory of mind
throughout the school years.
Problem, Purpose, and Research Question
Many researchers have different theories on theory of mind. It has been
speculated that theory of mind plays a role in social interaction skills and academic
success. However, the majority of research to date has focused on the development of
theory of mind in younger children. The empirical focus has been the initial acquisition
of theory of mind, neglecting the further development of theory of mind in the later
elementary years.
The purpose of this study was to assess the continuing development of theory of
mind in 9- and 11-year old children as suggested by the use of more complex mental state
terms. Oral and written narratives were contrasted to assess the use and complexity of
mental state references in both modes. Oral narratives are stories expressed verbally, and
written narratives are stories expressed in writing.
Many researchers have been interested in what children’s use of mental states
terms reveals about children’s developing theory of mind. However, these production
studies have focused solely on the oral domain (Bretherton & Beeghly, 1982; Hyter &
Westby, 1996; Wellman et al., 2000). Little data exist on the continuing acquisition and
complexity of the mental state lexicon of older children or the influence of narrative
modalities (i.e., oral vs. written) on the complexity of mental state references. Previous
research has examined the organization and knowledge of mental state verbs in older
children (Booth & Hall, 1995; Schwanenflugel et al., 1996), but has not compared the
complexity of the mental state verb lexicon across oral and written narratives. Only the
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Swedish study by Nordqvist (2001) examined mental state references in older children
using an oral-written contrast design. Since there is evidence that children develop
language skills over an oral-literate continuum, a difference would be expected between
the complexities of mental state verbs in oral versus written narratives.
The overall question was: Is acquiring theory of mind a developmental process
that continues during the school age years as evidenced by the use of more complex
mental state verbs? Two questions were addressed: 1) whether 9- and 11-year-old
typically developing children differed in their ability to use more complex mental state
verbs, and 2) whether this ability differed as a function of the oral versus written
modality.
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Chapter 2
Method
Inclusion Criteria
All participants were selected from one urban elementary school located in West
Central Florida. To be included in the study, 9- to 11-year-old children were typically
developing in accord with four inclusion criteria. These were: (1) not eligible or not
previously eligible for special education or related services; (2) hearing sensitivity within
normal limits; (3) age-appropriate vocabulary recognition according to performance on
the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test-3rd edition (PPVT-III) (Dunn & Dunn, 1997); and
(4) passing of a logical and/or a social second order false belief task (Silliman, Diehl,
Hnath-Chisolm, Bahr, Zenko, & Friedman, 2003).
Hearing screening. Children’s hearing was screened before the testing session
began. A Beltone Audio Scout audiometer calibrated to ANSI 1989 was used for an
audiometric screening. Participants responded to screening levels of 20dB HL at 1000,
2000, and 4000 Hz in order to pass the hearing screening.
PPVT-III. The PPVT-III (Dunn & Dunn, 1997) was administered as a measure of
general vocabulary familiarity. The start item for the 9-year-old participants was item
#73, set 7, while the start item for the 11-year-olds was item #85, set 8. According to the
PPVT-III technical manual, the start item is the first item in the appropriate set of test
questions designated for the test taker’s age. These starting items were derived so that test
takers in the middle 50% of any age group would meet the basal set criterion. The basal
set is the lowest set of items administered containing one or no errors. The ceiling set is
the highest set of items administered containing eight or more errors. Testing was
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discontinued as soon as the ceiling set was established. To be included in the study, a
participant’s score needed to be within + 1 standard deviation of the mean for each age
group (M = 100, SD = + 15). Table 2 in Appendix A contains the PPVT-III scores for all
participants.
Second-order false belief tasks. It is assumed that a more advanced theory of mind
is associated with more complex reference to mental states in both oral and written
narratives. Therefore, two second-order, implicit, false belief tasks (Silliman et al., 2003),
a logical inferencing task and a social inferencing task, were used to assess more
advanced concepts of mind characteristic of the 9-year to 11-year age span. To be
included in the study, participants had to pass at least one of the two tasks. Scores
obtained on the false belief tasks are also presented in Table 2 in Appendix A.
The first implicit false belief task required logical inferencing and was adapted
from Sullivan, Zaitchik, and Tager-Flusberg (1994) (see Appendix B). In this logical
second-order false belief task, the false beliefs about characters’ actions were not
explicitly stated. For example, a father buys his daughter a birthday present other than
what she is expecting and hides the present; however, unknown to the father, the daughter
saw what he got her for her birthday before the father gave her the gift. The father
remains unknowing when Grandma asks him what he thinks the daughter believes he got
her for her birthday. The implicit false belief question would then be: “What would Dad
say (to Grandma)?” Silliman et al. (2003) defined this task as one requiring logical
inferencing because it is primarily premised on cause-effect inferencing. Cause-effect
inferences necessitate that the child predict the missing information, in the case of the
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above example, the result of the explicitly stated cause or the effects of the conflicting
beliefs of the father and daughter that were the product of their different actions.
The second implicit false belief task, a social inferencing task, focuses on more
inner-directed perspectives that are motivated by affective states (see Appendix B).
Silliman et al. (2003) describe this mode of reasoning as social reasoning, which
represents a category of feeling/attitude inferences (Johnson & von Hoff Johnson, 1986).
For example, a child does not want a surprise birthday party because he becomes
embarrassed when he is the center of attention; instead, he wants to go to a baseball game
for his birthday. However, his father is planning a surprise birthday party because he does
not know that his son gets easily discomfited. The father thinks that a surprise birthday
party would make his son happy, even when the son tells the father he wants to go to a
baseball game for his birthday. The father remains unknowing about his son’s selfconsciousness when Grandma asks the father how her grandson will feel about having a
surprise birthday party. The second-order implicit false belief question would be: “What
would Dad say (to Grandma)?” In this task, the beliefs reconstructed derive from the
father and son’s inner-directed “feelings and attitudes” that motivate their actions.
Participants
A total of 55 children were assessed. Of the 55, 50 met the inclusion criteria. The
final sample consisted of 26 children ages 9;0-9;11 (M = 9;5, Range 9;0-9;11) and 24
children ages 11;00-11;11 (M = 11;3, Range 11;0-11;9). Of the 26 children in the 9-yearold group, 15 were female and 11 were male, 18 were Caucasian, 7 were AfricanAmerican, and 1 was Hispanic. Of the 24 children in the 11-year-old group, 14 were
female and 10 were male, 14 were Caucasian, 8 were African-American, 1 was Hispanic,
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and 1 was Asian-American. All children were from monolingual, English-speaking
homes and speakers of Standard American English, according to classroom teachers.
Approximately 70% of the school population was eligible for the federal lunch program,
and the school received Title I funds. The 9-year-old children were in third and fourth
grade classes, and the 11-year-old children were in fifth grade classes. Table 2 in
Appendix A contains a summary of the demographic data for the 50 participants.
Materials
Second-order false belief tasks. Both second order false belief tasks were
displayed in a binder containing illustrations depicting the two different scenarios and
scripted questions for both scenarios. The logical inferencing scenario consisted of 15
colored illustrations, and the social inferencing scenario consisted of 12 colored
illustrations. Protocol sheets were used to record all responses (see Appendix C for
sample).
Mental state verb priming task. A mental state and communication verb priming
task was given first. This task was administered based on the assumption that children
would show a preference for using mental state verbs and communication verbs when
these verbs were primed prior to the narrative task, which comprised the major portion of
the study.
The priming task consisted of two parts. In the first part, 16 3x5 cards with verbs
printed on the front of each card were presented. A total of 8 cards had action verbs (e.g.,
run, play, jump) printed on the front, and 8 cards had mental state verbs (e.g., think,
know, guess) printed on the front. The second part of the priming task consisted of an
additional 16 3x5 cards with verbs printed on the front of each card. A total of 8 cards

25

had action verbs (climb, crawl, push) printed on the front, and 8 cards had
communication verbs (e.g., discuss, beg, complain) printed on the front (see Appendix D
for a complete list of the priming verbs by category.) During piloting of the study,
children had difficulty separating the three categories at the same time in one task.
Therefore, the priming tasks were presented as two separate tasks, one task for mental
state verbs and one task for communication verbs, to make the task simpler.
Three headings printed on three different index cards were designed to assist
children in separating the cards during the priming task. One card had a header with the
word body printed on it and a picture of a child running next to the word. Another card
had mind printed on it with a picture of a child sitting at a desk with an inquisitive
expression on his face. The last card used as a header had the word communication
printed on it with a picture of someone orating in front of a podium next to the printed
word.
Narrative tasks. Both the oral and written narratives were elicited from an 11minute, 41-second, textless film, Frog Goes to Dinner (Osbourn & Templeton, 1985) in
CD-ROM format, based on the book by Mercer Mayer (1975). The multi-character story
is about a boy who takes his pet frog to dinner in an expensive restaurant, unknown to his
family. The frog wanders away from the boy and comes in contact with many different
characters and has numerous adventures in the restaurant before the boy finally finds him.
These adventures create conflicts in which beliefs about conventional social expectations
for how to behave in a restaurant are violated.
The film consisted of 13 episodes. An episode is the basic structure of a narrative
that, at a minimum, must consist of an Initiating Event (IE) or Goal (G), Action (A), and
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Outcome (O) (Westby, 1999). An episode analysis was conducted in order to estimate the
amount of opportunities for mental state occurrences within each episode. (A detailed
analysis of the episodes and possible mental state occurrences is located in Appendix E.)
Eight still frames from the film were used during the elicitation of the narratives
in order to reduce the working memory load on the participations while formulating their
oral and written narratives (see Appendix F for descriptions of the eight frames included).
The same three headers described under the priming task were also used during the
narrative task to reduce working memory demands and help children stay focused on the
task directions. Lined writing paper and pencils with erasers were provided for the
written mode of the narrative task.
Procedure
Prior to administration of the experimental tasks, completed consent forms
describing the task procedures were obtained from the parents. Children signed assent
forms as a prerequisite for their individual participation (see Appendix G for
consent/assent form).
The participants were tested in the fall and early spring of the 2002-2003 school
year. All testing was administered by one of two examiners, both of whom were Master
Degree students in speech-language pathology. Testing, including the hearing screening,
administration of the PPVT-III (Dunn & Dunn, 1997), second-order false belief tasks,
and narrative elicitations, was accomplished in two sessions approximately one week
apart and lasting approximately 45 minutes per session, for a total time that did not
exceed 90 minutes. Testing occurred in a quiet room on the school campus. Breaks were
provided as needed. Pencils and stickers were provided as rewards for participation.
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Second-order false belief tasks. Before administration of the logical and social
inferencing tasks, a brief set of instructions were read, including a purpose for the task.
Children were told that their help was needed to determine what the characters in the
picture scenarios were thinking and feeling. The illustrated binders were then presented
to each child.
Following the procedures of Sullivan et al. (1994) and Silliman et al. (2003), six
scripted questions accompanied each scenario (see Appendix B for the complete set of
questions). These questions were: (1) a first order question, (2) a reality question, (3) a
linguistic contrast question, (4) an ignorance question, (5) the second order question, and
(6) a justification question. The last question was included to ascertain children’s
rationale for their response to the second order question. If the second-order question was
not answered, assistance was provided using a cloze procedure. For example, Dad says,
“Pam thinks I got her _______.” The purpose of the cloze procedure, a form of guided
assistance (Silliman et al., 2003), was to reduce the complexity of language formulation
that might be competing with access of the underlying concept.
Responses to the six questions were recorded on data sheets. Points were assigned
as follows to the second order questions for each task: 2 = correct answer without
assistance, 1 = correct answer using the cloze procedure, 0 = incorrect answer or no
response. Each participant was required to obtain a score of at least 1 on the second order
question (i.e., question #5) for either the logical or the social inferencing task in order to
meet the passing criteria for the task.
Mental state verb priming task. The purpose of the priming task was to maximize
familiarity across participants about the difference among communication, cognitive, and
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physical action verbs. Although mental states can be verbs, adjectives, or adverbs, only
verbs were selected to provide a clear contrast among “things you do with your body,”
“things you do with your mind,” and “different ways of communicating.”
The task required children to differentiate between two types of verbs and
consisted of two parts. The first part of the priming task asked children to differentiate
between action verbs and cognitive verbs. The second part of the priming task asked the
children to differentiate between action verbs and communication verbs. Examples of
each type of verbs were individually printed on index cards, and participants were asked
to separate the cards into two piles: one pile of cognitive verbs and a second pile of
physical action verbs for the first part of the task, and one pile of communication verbs
and a second pile of physical action verbs for the second part of the task. Before
beginning the task, children were given examples of physical action verbs, cognitive
verbs, and communication verbs.
The first part of the task was introduced as follows:
“We’re going to play a game. I’m going to show you some verbs written on cards.
Verbs are words that express what you can do with your body or with your mind.
For example, you can use your mind to think and use your body to run. We’re
going to separate the two kinds of verbs into two piles. One pile will be things
you can do with your mind, and the other pile will be things you can do with your
body.”
Following this introduction, participants will be instructed as follows:
“Now it’s your turn. Put all the verbs about things you do with your mind in this
pile, and all the verbs about things you do with your body in this pile.”
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Scripted prompts were used as necessary, such as, “Tell me if that verb is something you
do with your mind or your body.” Participants were allowed a maximum of 10 minutes to
complete the task.
The second part of the task was introduced as follows:
“We’re going to play another game. Now I’m going to show you some more
verbs written on cards. These verbs are words that express what you can do with
your body or words that express different ways of communicating or talking. For
example, you can discuss when you communicate. We’re going to separate the
two kinds of verbs into two piles. One pile will be different ways of
communicating or talking, and the other pile will be things you can do with your
body.”
Following this introduction, participants were instructed as follows:
“Now it’s your turn. Put all the verbs that express different ways of
communicating in this pile, and all the verbs about things you do with your body
in this pile.”
Scripted prompts were used as necessary, such as, “Tell me if that verb describes a way
of communicating or something you do with your body.” Participants were allowed a
maximum of 10 minutes to complete the task, although all of the children completed the
task within 3 to 5 minutes.
Oral and written narrative tasks. The oral and written narratives were elicited
using the 11 minute, 41 second wordless CD-ROM, Frog Goes to Dinner (Osbourn &
Templeton, 1985) and were presented on a laptop computer. It should be noted that,
although the film is considered to be wordless, one vocal utterance is said by the boy, a
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major character (upon entering the kitchen, the boy sees a chef preparing to cook the frog
and yells, “No!”).
The examiner was present during the presentation of the film to maximize the
child’s focus on the landscape of consciousness and to increase the encoding of mental
state references. However, the examiner did not collaboratively watch the film with the
children in order to reduce child assumptions about familiarity. Both the oral and written
narratives were counterbalanced. A two-phase set of instructions, including a purpose,
were provided as follows:
“I’m writing a book and need some help coming up with a good story to go with
the video I’m going to show you. This video has many different characters. There
is a boy, a frog, a mom, a dad, a cook, a waiter, and some other people. Your
teacher told me that you’re a good storyteller. I need you to help me make up a
good story to go with the video. Let’s watch the video together.”
After the introduction, the following instructions were given before both the oral and
written tasks:
“I want you to make up the best story that you can to go with the video.
Remember that to tell/write a good story, you should talk about what’s going on
in the character’s minds. You need to say what they might be thinking, saying,
and feeling. Tell me what you think they might be thinking, feeling, and saying.
Here are some pictures from the story to help you remember.”
A maximum of eight still frames printed from the film were available to the child
following both the oral and written elicitations as a strategy to reduce possible verbal
working memory demands that could compete with language formulation demands (see
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Appendix H). Scripted questions were used as necessary as another form of guided
assistance to support children’s interpretation of the characters’ beliefs and their virtual
dialogue, as well as to maintain attentional focus on the formulation of mental state
references and quoted dialogue. Examples of scripted questions included:
(1) What was going on in the characters’ minds?
(2) What else could be going on in the characters’ minds?
(3) What might this character have been saying?
(4) Tell me how the characters are using their minds?
(5) Why do you think that character did that?
(6) How does the character feel?
(7) If I could listen to the characters talking, what would I hear?
(See Appendix I for complete scripts of the priming task and elicitation of narratives.)
The rationale for the inclusion of film frames and scripted prompts derived from
Wellman et al. (2001), who found that enhancing the salience of mental states was a
significant variable for improving children’s performance on false belief tasks regardless
of age. Therefore, an assumption was that enhanced salience would also heighten
production of mental states in oral and written narratives.
The oral and written conditions were presented in random order to minimize a
mode order effect. Participants were allowed a maximum of 10 minutes to respond in the
oral mode and 20 minutes to respond in the written mode. Depending on the school
accommodations, the writing task was sometimes administered as a small group task.
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Equipment
Both audio and video recordings were used to maximize accurate data
transcription. All of the sessions were video recorded with a tripod using a Memorex
SM1000 video recorder and audio recorded using an Optimus CTR-117 audio cassette
recorder. An Optimus 33-3013 tie-clip microphone was also used to ensure high quality
sound. The wordless video film was presented in CD-ROM format on a Dell Sx-700 laptop computer.
Data Reduction
All participants were assigned a numerical code to ensure anonymity. Individual
oral and written narratives were identified only with this numerical code.
Segmentation of oral and written narratives. The oral narratives were transcribed
and divided into T-units (terminable unit) and then entered into the Systematic Analysis
of Language Transcripts (SALT; Miller & Chapman, 1984). A T-unit is defined as a main
clause plus all subordinate clauses or non-clausal structures that are embedded within the
main clause (Hunt, 1965). All clauses that began with a coordinating conjunction (e.g.,
and, but) were considered separate clauses except when there was co-referential subject
deletion (Scott, 1988), for example, Mary got in her car and (she) went to the store. The
written narratives were also divided into T-units in the same manner.
Occurrence and classification of mental state references. All transcriptions were
analyzed for the presence of mental state terms. Possible mental states references,
including verbs, adjectives, and adverbs, compiled from previous research with children
from the late preschool to preadolescent years served as the basis for classification
(Astington, 1998a, 1998b; Bretherton & Beeghly, 1982; Ely & McCabe, 1993;
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Schwanflugel et al., 1996). This classification schema consisted of 68 terms: 24
motivational references, 33 experiential references, and 11 belief references (see
Appendix E). It should be noted that this schema was not exhaustive, but represented
potential examples that could possibly occur during the oral and written narrative
elicitation.
Consistent with the concept of a developmental continuum, mental state
references were classified into motivational, experiential, and belief categories.
Motivational mental states express desire, need, and intentionality (e.g., want, need, try),
including the intention to communicate (e.g., say, tell, ask, complain). Other types of
motivational mental references express the aspect of possibility as an intentional state
(e.g., can, will, might). Experiential mental states typically consist of perception
references referring to sight, hearing, taste, and touch (e.g., see, hear, taste, smell, feel)
and situational emotion references (Baron-Cohen, 1995) that may be motivated by
physiological reactions to a mental state (e.g., thirsty, angry, hungry, happy).
Finally, belief mental states index broader conceptual and multidimensional
understanding of others’ minds in terms of the mental processes that govern cognitive
and verbal activities (e.g., know, guess, explain, realize, wonder, promise) (Bartsch &
Wellman, 1995; Bretherton & Beeghly, 1982; Schwanflugel et al., 1996). Specifically,
beliefs refer to a continuum of degrees of uncertainty to degrees of certainty. Belief verbs
may also be constructed with modals to express uncertainty, for example, “Tom thought
that he might have been a good runner if he practiced more often.” As such, belief
references may reflect a more literate conceptual understanding of mental states and
occur more often in the written register of schooling than in the oral register typical of
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everyday conversation. (See Appendix G for coding of the mental states and examples.)
If any additional mental states were found in the data, they were included if the
examiners agreed on the classification.
Qualitative analyses of belief verbs: Diversity, complexity, and depth. Mental
state references were also analyzed qualitatively. One analysis examined lexical diversity
of mental state references between the two age groups in the oral and written modes. A
second analysis sought to discern patterns of most frequent and more complex production
of belief verbs only. One criterion for determining complexity was age specific. Belief
verbs not used by the 9 year old group in either condition but produced only by the 11
year old group were interpreted as more complex.
A second complexity criterion was based on Beck, McKeown, and Kucan (2002).
These authors categorized words into three levels of word tiers, with Tier 1 representing
high frequency, or commonly used, words, such as baby, happy, and walk. On the other
hand, Tier 2 meanings are more literate meanings consistent with the written language
register (whether this register is used orally or in writing), such as comment, vicissitudes,
and inquiry. These meanings are generally slow mapped, or elaborated with experience,
as opposed to the fast mapping of more commonly used words. Tier 3 meanings are
specific to subject domains, such as mathematics, geography, literary analysis, etc., for
example, algebraic, peninsula, and deconstruction. The analysis of more complex belief
verbs drew on Tier 2 meanings.
A final qualitative analysis was conduced on a preliminary basis to examine the
lexical depth of think. As modified from Nordqvist (2001), variations in the meaning of
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think were examined in their specific social contexts. The purpose was to determine the
extent to which the meaning of think represented degrees of uncertainty and certainty.
Examiner Agreement
Two graduate students in speech-language pathology served as raters for the oral
and written samples. Prior to analyzing the data, the students formulated a coding system
for classification of mental state references into three categories (i.e., motivational,
experiential, belief). The examiners reached 90% agreement when coding sample
responses that were not included in the study. Any disagreement as to classification of a
particular mental state reference was resolved by discussion. Based on the piloting of the
coding system, modifications were made before the system was actually applied to the
study’s data.
Intercoder agreement for coding consistency using an independent coder was
conducted for 16 narratives from the oral and written samples (16% of the total). The
samples were randomly chosen, such that the two age groups and two conditions (oral
versus written) were equally represented (i.e., four 9-year-old oral narratives, four 9-yearold written narratives, four 11-year-old oral narratives, and four 11-year-old written
narratives). The primary coder was a doctoral level student in Speech-Language
Pathology. Training was accomplished by explaining and identifying mental state
references in practice narratives not included in the sample.
Prior to coding, consensus was reached on how to divide the transcripts into Tunits. Intercoder agreement was then calculated in a series of steps. First, percentage
agreement for whether a T-unit contained one or more mental state references was
determined. The coders obtained 92% agreement for identification of T-units containing
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mental state references. Next, in those instances in which a T-unit contained one or more
mental state references, the references were coded as motivational verb, experiential
adjective or verb, or belief verb. Cohen’s kappa was used to determine the consistency of
response coding of the mental state references. The resulting kappa for mental state
references was k = .95. This represents a high level of consistency for coding categories
(Bakeman & Gottman, 1997).

37

Chapter 3
Results
This study was designed to determine the existence of differences in the use of
mental state references by 9- and 11-year-old typically developing children. Quantitative
and qualitative analyses were conducted to answer two questions:
1. Did 9- and 11-year-old typically developing children differ in their use of
mental state references?
2. Did this ability differ as a function of the oral versus written modality?
Data Analysis
Statistical analyses were conducted first to determine whether T-unit distributions
differed according to age group and narrative condition. Then, differences were examined
as related to among age group, the frequency of mental state references by category, and
narrative condition. A three-way MANOVA was conducted for this purpose, specifically,
2 (Age 9 versus Age 11) x 4 (mental state categories) x 2 (oral versus written modalities).
For this analysis, the independent variables were age of participants (9 and 11 years),
type of narrative (oral versus written), and type of mental state reference (motivational
verbs, experiential verbs and adjectives, and belief verbs). The dependent variable was
frequency of mental state code responses.
Raw data frequencies were normalized by dividing the number of specific mental
state references by the total number of T-units. Post-hoc tests were run as appropriate. In
addition, qualitative analyses were conducted to examine the variety, complexity, and
depth of belief verbs in the oral and written narratives for both 9 year olds and 11 year
olds.
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Results are organized as follows. First, the MANOVA results of T-units are
reported. Next, MANOVA results that address the two research questions are presented.
An additional qualitative analysis of belief verb complexity is then provided, followed by
a summary of the important findings.
T-unit Analysis
All narratives were transcribed and divided into T-units (Hunt, 1965). Next, the
transcripts were entered into the software program Systematic Analysis of Language
Transcriptions (SALT; Miller & Chapman, 1984). SALT produced type and frequency
data for the mental state references.
A descriptive analysis was conducted to determine the average number of T-units,
the number of words used, and the average T-unit length per narrative in the oral and
written contrasts for both the 9- and 11-year olds. As seen in the Table 1 summary, the 9
year olds produced an average of 57.1 T-units in the oral modality and 26.0 T-units in the
written modality, while the 11 year olds produced an average of 70.6 T-units in the oral
modality and 36.4 T-units in the written modality. The range in T-units for each age
group indicates the wide variability between individuals. Average T-unit length for
participants in the 9-year-old group was 9.9 in the oral modality and 9.1 in the written
modality; average T-unit length for participants for the 11-year-old group was 9.4 in the
oral modality and 10.2 in the written modality.
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Table 1. Descriptive Data for 9 and 11 year olds in the Oral and Written Domains.
Average # of T-

Average # of T-

Average T-unit

Average T-unit

units: Oral

units: Written

length: Oral

length: Written

Narratives

Narratives

Narratives

Narratives

9 year

57.1

26.0

9.9

9.1

olds

(Range = 20-154)

(Range = 8-68)

11 year

70.6

36.4

9.4

10.2

olds

(Range = 23-148)

(Range = 9-56)

Three separate multivariate ANOVAs (MANOVAs) were conducted to determine
differences attributable to age group and/or narrative condition (oral vs. written). The
MANOVA for number of T-units revealed significant main effects for condition, F(1,48)
= 52.399, p < .001, η2 = .522, and group, F(1,48) = 4.589, p = .037, η2 = .087. The
interaction between narrative condition and age group was not significant, F(1,48) = .117,
p = .733, η2 = .002. These findings suggest that the 11-year-olds produced more T-units
overall and that both age groups produced more T-units in the oral condition. The effect
sizes suggest that the finding for the narrative condition (oral vs. written) was a stronger
finding than the group difference, which was of minimal significance.
The second MANOVA considered the influence of age group and narrative
condition on the number of words produced. Like the previous MANOVA, there were
significant main effects for condition, F(1,48) = 55.138, p < .001, η2 = .535, and age
group, F(1,48) = 7.610, p = .008, η2 = .137. The interaction between narrative condition
and age group was not significant, F(1,48) = .023, p = .879, η2 = .000. These findings
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support the previous findings, both in significance and effect size calculations, in that the
11-year-old group produced more words than the 9-year-old group and that more words
were produced in the oral condition than in the written condition.
The third MANOVA for differences in T-unit length revealed somewhat different
findings. In this case, none of the findings were significant. This suggests that there is no
difference between age groups or between narratives conditions for T-unit length. In
other words, T-unit lengths were comparable across groups and conditions.
Analysis of Mental State References
The results of a three-way MANOVA revealed a significant interaction between
age and reference type, F(3,144) = 4.999; p = .007, partial η2 = .094. Post hoc testing
using the Bonferroni procedure revealed that one paired comparison was significant. As
illustrated in Figure 1, this significant difference was attributed to the experiential verb
category. The use of experiential verbs was significantly greater for the 11 years olds
than the 9 year olds. However, the partial η2 indicated that this interaction explained very
little (9%) of the variance between these factors, so this age difference is of minor
importance. This effect size interpretation is further substantiated by the lack of a
significant main effect for age, F(1,48) = .942, p = .341. This finding suggested that the
two age groups did not significantly differ in the number of occurrences of mental state
references. Therefore, both age groups appeared to use each mental state reference
category with equal frequency.
The significant two-way interaction between reference type and modality, F
(3,109) = 11.407; p < .001; partial η2 = .192, is the primary finding in this MANOVA.
The partial η2 accounted for 19% of the variance between these factors.
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Figure 1. Frequency of Use of Mental State References by Age.
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When paired samples t-tests with a Bonferroni correction were conducted to evaluate
comparisons across reference types within modalities, 11/12 pairwise comparisons of
interest were significant (p < .001). As illustrated in Figure 2, the non-significant
comparison was between the belief and the motivational references in the oral modality.
In this case, there was no significant difference in the oral use of these two verb types.
The experiential verb category occurred with the greatest frequency, followed by
motivational references, then belief references, and finally experiential adjectives. Paired
samples t-tests with a Bonferroni correction revealed that the frequency of mental state
references was always greater in the oral condition.
It should also be noted that the main effects for modality, F(1,144) = 60.913, p <
.0001, partial η2 = .558, and reference type, F(3,144) = 72.92; p<.0001; partial η2 = .603
were significant. The significant main effect for modality indicated that mental state
references were produced more frequently in the oral narratives for both age groups. The
significant main effect for reference type suggested that the reference categories occurred
with different frequencies. Experiential verbs were produced most frequently in both
modalities, with motivational verbs, belief verbs, and experiential adjectives occurring
less frequently in that order for both modalities.
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Figure 2. Differences Noted by Reference Type and Modality.
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Qualitative Analyses
Qualitative analyses were completed to compare the diversity, complexity, and
depth of mental state references in the oral and written narratives between the two
different age groups. Belief verbs were chosen for this analysis because they were best
suited to show different levels of lexical complexity.
Diversity. Table 2 displays the diversity of belief verbs produced. The 9 year olds
produced a total of 194 belief verbs, with 134 verbs in the oral modality and 60 verbs in
the written modality; the 11 year olds produced a total of 196 belief verbs, with 122 verbs
in the oral modality and 74 verbs in the written modality.
In terms of variation, the 9 year olds produced 29 different belief verbs in the oral
condition and 22 different belief verbs in the written condition, while the 11 year olds
produced 27 different belief verbs in the oral condition and 25 in the written condition.
As the frequencies indicate, variations of “think,” including “think,” “thinks,” “thought,”
and “thinking,” were most common for both age groups in both modalities. For the 9 year
olds, the next most frequently occurring belief verbs were “notice,” “know,” and “find
out” in the oral modality and “know,” “decided,” and “notice” in the written modality.
For the 11 year olds, the next most frequently occurring belief verbs were “know,”
“notice,” and “forget” in the oral modality and “notice,” “check,” and “decide” in the
written modality.
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Table 2. Diversity of Belief Verbs Produced by the 9 and 11 Year Old Participants as
Displayed in Order of Frequency for the Oral and Written Narratives (Number in
Parenthesis Reflects the Frequency of the Verb).
9 year olds (n =26)

11 year olds (n = 24)

Think (37)

Think (27)

Narratives Notice (9)

Know (12)

Oral

Know, find out (7)

Notice (11)

Search (5)

Forget (8)

Check, decide, feel, forget, realize (4)

Realize (7)

Wonder (3)

Feel, find out (5)

Figure out, guess, like, love (2)

Decide, remember, wonder (3)

Allow, assume, discover, figure, hope, Check, guess, like, make sure, search
let, mind, remember, want, wish (1)

(2)
Believe, check on, enjoy, exaggerate,
figure out, plan, pretend, see (1)

Written

Think (14)

Think (18)

Narratives Know (5)

Notice (9)

Decide, notice (4)

Check, decide, realize (4)

Find (3)

Forget, know (3)

Check, figure out, forget, search (2)

Like, worry (2)

Discover, felt, find out, guess, had an

Believe, bet, explore, find out, guess,

idea, like, mind, propose, realize,

have no clue, hope, love, mind,

saying in his mind (1)

remember, see, wonder (1)
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Complexity. Table 3 shows the most frequently used belief verbs, as well as the
more complex belief verbs, that each age group produced alone. The use of more
complex belief verbs demonstrates the understanding of more complex cognitive
processes. As Table 3 indicates, the 11 year olds demonstrated greater semantic
complexity in their production of belief verbs, such as believe, exaggerate, plan, pretend,
and worry. These verbs refer to the certainty-uncertainty domain.

Table 3. Most Frequent Use and More Complex Use of Belief Verbs as Produced in the
Oral and Written Narratives.
Most Frequent Use

More Complex Use

9 year

Oral modality – think, notice, know,

(References not used by 11 year olds)

olds

find out

Oral modality – assume, discover

(n = 26)

Written modality – think, know,

Written modality – propose

decide, notice
11 year

Oral modality – think, know, notice,

(References not used by 9 year olds)

olds

forget

Oral modality – believe, exaggerate,

(n = 24)

Written modality – think, notice,

plan, pretend

check, decide

Written modality – explore, worry,
wonder

In summary, the 9 year olds were capable of generating mental state verbs, such
as “assume,” “discovered,” and “wish” in the oral mode and “proposed” in the written
mode. The 11 year olds did not produce these verbs. In contrast, the 11 year olds
generated more tokens of complex belief verbs than did the 9 year olds.
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Lexical depth. When analyzing children’s use of think in context to determine
lexical depth, Nordqvist (2001) differentiated between “think as experience” versus
“think as having an opinion.” However, there is no consensus on procedures for
analyzing lexical depth; therefore, to attempt a finder differentiation of meanings of the
same word, random samples of the 11 year olds’ narratives were selected to examine
variations in meaning of the belief verb think according to their specific social contexts.
As a result of this preliminary analysis, five belief variations emerged that indicated
degrees of certainty or uncertainty. The variations included “think as decide,” think as
realize,” “think as ask oneself,” “think as have an opinion,” and “think as believe.” An
example of each variation follows:
1) “He thought (decided) he would bring the frog with him.” In this situation, the
boy was preparing to go to dinner with his parents; he saw the frog in the
dresser drawer and decided (was certain he wanted) to take the frog with him.
2) “and the boy looks worried that the guy might think (realize) that he has a frog
with him.;” Here, as the boy was getting out of the car at the restaurant, the
parking valet heard the frog croak. The boy’s face registered uncertainty that
the valet might realize he had a frog.
3) “He was probably thinking (asking himself), why would a boy bring a frog to
a restaurant.” In the same valet situation, just described, the valet’s facial
expression could be interpreted as registering uncertainty that he heard a
sound akin to a frog’s croaking; thus, he might have been asking himself about
the reality of what he heard.
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4) “She thought (had an opinion) she was just exaggerating.” In this event, a
woman and a man were dining at a table and the frog, which had jumped into
the salad, was served to the woman. The woman appeared uncertain because
she thought that she saw a frog in her salad, but then the frog disappeared,
leading her to have an opinion that she was just exaggerating [imagining] the
situation.
5) “and he thought (believed) he had caught it with these three little bowls.” In
this scenario, the frog had made his way to the kitchen and was being chased
by the kitchen personnel. One of the men tried to capture the frog with three
upside-down mixing bowls, but then was uncertain about which bowl the frog
might be under. However, he believed he had caught the frog underneath one
of the bowls.
The results from this preliminary analysis indicate that by age 11 years, some
children are aware of different levels, or depths, of meaning for belief references. In
addition, they are able to demonstrate their understanding of these levels through
selecting variations that reveal the multidimensional aspects of the meaning of a word,
such as think.
Summary of Findings
Contrary to expectations, there were no significant differences between the 9 year
old and 11 year old participants in their frequency of use of mental state references in the
oral and written narratives. The results of this study did indicate that experiential verbs
were used most frequently and experiential adjectives were used least frequently in both
the oral and written modalities. Motivational and belief verbs were used relatively
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equally in the oral domain and motivation references were used more frequently than
belief in the written domain. Both age groups also produced more mental state references
in the oral mode than in the written mode.
A qualitative analysis of the belief verb category suggested the possibility of a
transitional shift, in terms of both breadth and depth, from more oral to more literate
lexical knowledge. This trend was evident more so for the 11 year olds than the 9 year
olds. The 11 year old children in this study generated narratives in both the oral and
written modes that contained belief verbs reflecting more diversity, complexity, and
lexical depth than did the 9 year old children. Although this developmental transition was
slight, it was also noted by Nordqvist (2001).
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Chapter 4
Discussion
Prior studies have primarily investigated continuing theory of mind development
in older children by focusing on the organization of specific mental state verbs (i.e.,
know) (Booth & Hall, 1995; Schwanenflugel, Fabricius, & Noyes, 1996). With one
exception, the Swedish study by Nordqvist (2001), previous studies have not investigated
different types of mental state references using an oral-written contrast paradigm. Thus,
the results from this study do not have a rich comparative framework. To interpret the
results, three methodological factors and two conceptual issues are discussed initially.
Then, directions for future research, including clinical implications, are presented.
Methodological Issues
At least three methodological issues impacted on the quantity and quality of the
narratives in both modalities. These issues were: a) sample representativeness; b) the
influence of the priming task, instructions, and elicitation method on performance; and c)
the age interval of the two groups in the study.
Sample Representativeness
A major question is whether the study’s procedures solicited a representative
sample of children’s knowledge of mental state references. One source of evidence for
representativeness was the average number of T-units. The general rule of thumb for the
oral domain is that a minimum of 50 T-units is needed to meet a representative criterion,
especially when lexical diversity is a focus (e.g., Watkins, Kelly, Harbers, & Hollis,
1995). Both age groups in this study exceeded the 50 T-unit minimums. The 9 year old
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group produced an average of 57.1 T-units, while the 11 year old group produced an
average of 70.6 T-units.
The criterion for representativeness is less clear for writing, for example, whether
formal units or specific time intervals should serve as the method for obtaining a
representative sample. Some (e.g., Hughes, McGillivray, and Schmidek, 1997) suggest
that 50 to 60 T-units should be collected, while others (Apel, Masterson, & Niessen,
2004) recommend a minimum of 50-100 words. However, there are minimal data to
support that 50-60 T-units or 50-100 words are sufficient for analysis purposes in writing.
The average written T-unit length collected in this study was 26.0 for the 9 year
olds and 36.4 for the 11 year olds. Hence, as might be predicted, the older group was
capable of generating more information than was the younger group. A qualification is in
order as the children in this study were given only 20 minutes to plan and write their
written narratives. If given more time, it is possible that they would have produced a
greater number of T-units in the written modality.
In view of the absence of normative T-unit data for writing, a conservative
conclusion is that the writing samples were representative of children’s abilities in
general and their capability to produce mental state references specifically. What seems
most relevant for representativeness, however, is that children’s knowledge production
was assessed in both the oral and written domain.
Influence of the Priming Task, Instructions, and Elicitation Method on Performance
Influence of the priming task. One difference between the present study and the
study by Nordqvist (2001) was the implementation of a priming task to familiarize
participants with the difference between cognitive verbs, communication verbs, and
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action verbs. The advantage of this priming procedure was that the children had recent
experience with categorizing mental state references previous to generating their oral and
written narratives, and, therefore, may have been less inclined to focus on only the
actions in the video. An issue, however, is that children’s exposure to various cognitive
and communication verbs prior to narrative generation may have led to a high incidence
of the verb think, a finding that will be addressed shortly. Despite this possibility, both
groups of children also generated numerous mental state references, including belief
verbs, that were not used for the priming task.
Influence of the instructions and elicitation method. One methodological factor
that may have increased the participants’ engagement in the narrative activities was the
presentation of a purpose prior to initiating either the oral or written conditions.
Specifically, children were asked for their help in writing a book to go with the video,
and knowledge of a meaningful purpose may have been contributed to their interest and
engagement.
In addition, the elicitation methods for both oral and written narratives included
an emphasis on what the characters in the video were thinking, feeling, and saying, which
appeared to encourage a sharing and coordination of character perspectives. Instructions
explicitly stated that “To tell/write a good story, you should talk about what’s going on in
the character’s minds. You need to say what they might be thinking, saying, and feeling.”
Furthermore, the eight still frames presented to the children during production of the
narratives were also chosen for the various facial expressions, reflecting different moods,
thoughts, and feelings of the characters. From an observational point of view, most
children utilized the frames to some extent in their story generations.
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The combined effects of these methodological factors, including the priming task,
explicit directions with purpose, and still frames from the video, are unknown. However,
one viable conclusion is that each contributed support to the quantity and richness of the
narratives obtained. The issue of presentation format, including modality differences,
remains important for both educational and clinical purposes (Schneider & Dube, 2005).
The Age Interval
There was an unexpected lack of variability in age in the production of mental
state references. In retrospect, a study limitation was the participants’ age interval. The
particular ages chosen for the study, 9 and 11 years, were selected because these are the
ages when typical children become immersed in more literate language use in the school
setting, including vocabulary, reading, and writing.
Results showed substantial variability in production across the three mental state
categories for both age groups, suggesting that differences within and between the ages
were great. At some level, this variability is consistent with the transition from less oral
to more literate language expression during the preadolescent years (Rubin, 1987; Scott,
1999), when children begin to shift from “talk like books” to “write like books.” Because
of this transition, and the marked variability in individual difference that seems
associated with it, an expanded age interval appears necessary for any follow-up study.
As an example, Nordqvist’s (2001) study showed greater differences in the lexical
diversity and depth of mental state verb production between 9 year olds and 15 year olds
than between the 9 year old and the 12 year old groups. Therefore, future research in this
area should further explore lexical diversity, complexity, and depth in children with
greater age intervals than the two age groups included in this study.
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Conceptual Issues
Lexical Diversity and Complexity
A critical conceptual question is whether the patterns of results support a
continuum of development for mental state references. The increasing lexical diversity
and complexity demonstrated by the 11 year olds, as opposed to the 9 year olds, would
appear to indicate progression along a developmental continuum. This progression may
provide evidence of a developmental shift from more oral to more literate uses of
vocabulary, depending on the situation. Evidence of a developmental shift was also
acknowledged by Nordqvist (2001).
The qualitative analyses provided evidence for increasing lexical diversity and
complexity in the production of mental state references by the older children, as
compared to the younger group. The 11 year olds generated more instances, or greater
diversity, of more semantically and cognitively complex mental state references,
especially in the belief category. Six examples of the greater scope of complexity follow.
Specifically, the 9 year old children produced less complex meanings denoting the
characters’ certainty about key story events (examples 1 and 2) versus those produced by
the 11 year old group (examples 3 – 6):
1. “And the lady got the frog with the salad.
But at first she doesn’t know” (9 year old oral narrative)
2. “And then he finally noticed…” (9 year old written narrative)
3. “And he realized that the frog wasn’t there” (11 year old oral narrative)
4. “But they just pretended that it was nothing” (11 year old oral narrative)
5. “But the boy is unaware” (11 year old written narrative)
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6. “…his frog got out of his pocket unnoticed” (11 year old written narrative)
According to Beck et al. (2002), the belief references produced by the 11 year old
children would be examples of more literate use of Tier 2 words, or meanings more
characteristic of the written language register. These “written register” meanings
significantly contribute to a richly elaborated semantic network, which may not be
evident until grade 6 for many children (McGregor, 2004).
Examples 4, 5 and 6 are especially interesting because all three are derived
meanings; that is, they all have a prefix (pre-, un-) attached to the root words as the
lexical mechanism for expressing more complex thinking about the absence of awareness
in others. Examples of derivations were seldom found in the 9 year old transcripts. One
conclusion is that individual 11 year old children appeared to be advancing in their
second order coordination of the multidimensional relationships that index states of
consciousness in others, especially those states that reflect degrees of certainty or
factivity. An individual profile analysis in future research would aid in comparing group
and individual differences.
Lexical Depth
In regard to revealing lexical depth, the coding of the belief verbs may have been
an issue, since only the verb itself was considered based on the classification protocol.
Unlike some previous studies (Booth & Hall, 1995; Schwanenflugel et al., 1996), belief
verbs, such as think and know, were not interpreted along the certainty-uncertainty
continuum. Also, variations in meaning (see Nordqvist, 2001), such as the difference
between “think as experience” versus “think as having an opinion,” were not fully
analyzed in their syntactic or social contexts of occurrence. However, a preliminary
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analysis revealed five variations in meaning for the belief verb, think. Four of the five
variations referred to uncertainty, while three of the four co-occurred with sentential
complementation, either the marked or unmarked form, e.g.,
“And the boy looks worried that the guy might think that he has a frog with him
(marked form).”
“She thought [that] she was just exaggerating (unmarked form).”
Thus, it appears that, in accord with Nixon’s (2005) findings on preschoolers, even
during preadolescence, “syntactic constraints and cognitive complexity” (p. 34),
combined with inferences about the social situation, continue to influence the emergence
of the varied meanings of belief verbs.
The findings from the extended examination of these meanings suggest that
children’s progressive understanding of others’ minds will require an analysis of both the
linguistic and social contexts in which mental state references are expressed. This
interpretation is consistent not only with the findings from Booth and Hall (1995) but also
with a recommendation from Montgomery (2005). More valid assessment of theory of
mind will require “broadening the range of words and visual and situational cues
employed in (theory of mind) tasks” (Montgomery, 2005, p. 119).
Future Research Directions
The oral-written contrast paradigm demonstrated the quantity and richness of
narrative production possible from typically developing preadolescent children. Future
research should focus on the inclusion of explicit priming tasks and explicit directions to
assess their relevance in soliciting greater scope and depth of mental state references. In
addition, drawing on children’s situational knowledge of social contexts in which
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thoughts and beliefs are attributed to other people also seems beneficial in encouraging
children to express the mental state references they are typically capable of producing.
Finally, subsequent work should focus on standards for a representative writing sample,
comparing whether number of words, number of T-units, or time intervals are the most
reliable units.
Most importantly, analyzing belief verbs such as think and know in their linguistic
and social contexts to determine significant variations in meaning would seem imperative
in order to reveal the nuances of lexical depth not evident by categorization alone. Since
“belief” is an abstract concept (you can’t see a belief, much less degrees of certainty or
uncertainty), how children assimilate and express their evolving understanding of such
abstract concepts throughout their childhood is relevant to their understanding of others’
behaviors and their skills with social interactions. Being aware of the subtleties of
meaning inherent in mental state references is an indication of more advanced cognitive,
lexical, and, potentially, syntactic growth. Analyzing different levels of meaning for
cognitive verbs of uncertainty may be a powerful way to paint a more complete picture of
developmental differences in the semantic lexicon of older children.
A second area of research concerns Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). Past
research on children with ASD indicates that this particular developmental disorder is
characterized by significant limitations in theory of mind development (Baron-Cohen,
1995). Communication and social interactions with others are hampered when children
with autism are unable to attribute mental states to other people or predict the behavior of
others’ based on their interpretation of mental states. Previous studies have not attempted
to elicit mental state references from children with autism using a priming task or via an
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oral-written contrast paradigm. Since there is wide variability in lexical, syntactic, and
discourse skills across the autistic spectrum, initial studies in this area should focus on
higher functioning children, such as those with Asperger’s syndrome.
Conclusion
In summary, the results of this study suggest evidence of children’s progress on a
developmental continuum in the acquisition of more complex mental state references,
such as belief verbs, indicating that theory of mind development continues to advance in
preadolescent children. Although only a slight developmental shift was evident in the
production of mental state references between the ages of 9 and 11 years, future research
with broader age intervals may reveal more evidence of a developmental continuum that
continues to progress in complexity and flexibility throughout adolescence and young
adulthood. These results also offer evidence of the length of time required to acquire
more intricate lexical knowledge. In this view, theory of mind development is not simply
an acquisition that stops in the preschool years, but is an ongoing transformation of mind
sharing and perspective taking that enrich social interactions with others throughout our
lives.
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Appendix A: Table 2. Age, Gender, Ethnicity, and Results of Inclusion Criteria Measures
for the 50 Participants.

Age

Gender

Grade

Ethnicity

PPVT-III

9;0
9;0
9;1
9;1
9;1
9;3
9;4
9;4
9;4
9;5
9;5
9;5
9;6
9;6
9;6
9;7
9;7
9;8
9;9
9;9
9;10
9;11
9;11
9;11
9;11
9;11
11;0
11;1
11;1
11;2

Female
Male
Female
Female
Male
Male
Male
Male
Female
Female
Male
Female
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Female
Male
Female
Female
Female
Female
Female
Male
Male
Female
Female
Male
Female

3rd
3rd
3rd
4th
3rd
4th
4th
4th
3rd
4th
4th
3rd
4th
3rd
3rd
4th
4th
4th
3rd
4th
4th
4th
4th
4th
3rd
3rd
5th
5th
5th
5th

Caucasian
AA
Caucasian
Caucasian
AA
Caucasian
AA
AA
Caucasian
AA
Caucasian
Caucasian
Hispanic
Caucasian
Caucasian
Caucasian
Caucasian
Caucasian
Caucasian
Caucasian
Caucasian
Caucasian
Caucasian
Caucasian
AA
AA
Hispanic
Caucasian
Caucasian
Caucasian

85
89
85
115
121
99
100
118
115
114
106
112
108
102
94
103
115
107
109
104
99
103
91
110
106
120
99
93
108
107
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Logical
Task
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
0
2
0
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

Social
Task
0
0
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
0
2
2
2
2
2
2

Appendix A: (Continued)
Age

Gender

Grade

Ethnicity

PPVT-III

11;2
11;2
11;2
11;2
11;3
11;3
11;3
11;3
11;3
11;3
11;3
11;4
11;4
11;5
11;5
11;5
11;5
11;8
11;8
11;9

Female
Female
Male
Female
Female
Female
Male
Male
Female
Male
Male
Female
Female
Male
Male
Male
Male
Female
Female
Female

5th
5th
5th
5th
5th
5th
5th
5th
5th
5th
5th
5th
5th
5th
5th
5th
5th
5th
5th
5th

AA
AA
Caucasian
AA
Asian
Caucasian
Caucasian
Caucasian
Caucasian
AA
AA
AA
Caucasian
AA
Caucasian
AA
Caucasian
Caucasian
Caucasian
Caucasian

89
105
124
103
94
114
111
114
111
107
103
103
89
87
93
105
110
99
98
108
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Logical
Task
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

Social
Task
0
2
2
2
2
2
2
0
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

Appendix B: Second-Order False Belief Tasks
Logical Inferencing Scenario:
1. Implicit False Belief: (modified from Sullivan et al., 1994)
This is a story about Pam and her Dad. Today is Pam’s birthday and she’s having a big
party tonight. Dad is surprising her with a new bike that he has hidden in the living room.
See? Here is the surprise bike. Pam and Dad are in the kitchen talking about her birthday.
Pam says, “Dad, I really want a new bike for my birthday.” Now remember, Dad wants
the bike to be a surprise, so he says, “Sorry, I didn’t get you that. I got you roller blades
instead.”
First Order Question: What does Pam think Dad got her for her birthday? (If necessary,
Fill in: Pam thinks Dad got her ____.)
Reality Question: What did Dad really get her for her birthday? (If necessary, Fill in:
Dad really got Pam ___.)
Then Pam says to Dad, “O.K., well I’m going over to my friend’s house. I’ll be home
later. On her way out, Pam goes into the living room to get her umbrella because it’s
raining. In the living room, she finds her new bike! She thinks to herself, “Yes! Dad did
not get me roller blades. He really got me a bike. Dad does not see Pam go into the living
room and find the bike.
Linguistic Contrast Question: Does Dad know that Pam saw her bike in the living room?
Later, Pam’s grandmother comes over for the party. Grandma asks Dad, “Does Pam
know what you got her for her birthday?
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Appendix B: (Continued)
Ignorance Question: What does Dad say? (If necessary, Fill in: Dad says ____.). Now
remember, Dad does not know that Pam saw what he got her for her birthday. Then
Grandma asks Dad, “What does Pam think you got her for her birthday?
Second Order Question: What does Dad say? (If necessary, Fill in: Dad says, “Pam
thinks I got her ___.”).
Justification Question: Why does Dad say that?
Social Inferencing Task:
2. Implicit False-Belief:
This is a story about Frank and his Dad. Today is Frank’s birthday. Frank wants to go to a
baseball game for his birthday. He does not want a surprise party for his birthday. Frank
hates surprise parties. He gets embarrassed when everyone looks at him and yells
“Surprise!” Frank’s Dad is giving him a surprise birthday party. Dad bought Frank
balloons and a birthday cake and hid them in the living room. Dad does not know that
Frank gets embarrassed at surprise parties. Dad thinks Frank would be glad to have a
surprise party. Frank and Dad are in the kitchen talking about his birthday. Frank says,
“Dad I really want to go to a baseball game for my birthday.” Now remember, Dad wants
the party to be a surprise, so he says, “Frank, that’s a good idea. I will think about it.”
First Order Question: What does Frank hope that Dad will do for his birthday? (If
necessary, Fill-in: Frank hopes that Dad will _____).
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Appendix B: (Continued)
Reality Question: What did Dad really do for Frank’s birthday? (If incorrect, say: “But
remember, Dad wants to surprise Frank with the party.” If necessary, Fill-in: Dad really
____).
Then Frank says to Dad, “Great, I’m going to tell my friend next door, I’ll be home
later.” On his way out, Frank sees the balloons and cake hidden in the living room. He
thinks, “Oh no! Dad is giving me a surprise party; we are not going to the baseball
game.” Remember, Dad does not see Frank go into the living room and find the balloons
and cake.
Linguistic Contrast Question: Does Dad know that Frank is disappointed? (If necessary,
Fill in: n/a).
Later, Frank’s grandmother comes over for the party. Grandma asks Dad, “Does Frank
like surprise parties?”
Ignorance Question: What does Dad say? (If necessary, Fill-in: Dad says__).
Now remember, Dad does not know that Frank gets embarrassed at surprise parties. Then
Grandma asks Dad, “How will Frank feel about having a surprise party?”
Second Order Question: What does Dad say? (If necessary, Fill-in: Frank will be ____).
Justification Question: Why does Dad say that?
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Appendix C: Score Sheet for False Belief Tasks
Name: _______________________
School:_______________________
Ethnicity: _____________________
Birthday: ___-___-___

Date: ___-___-___
Gender: M
F
Grade: _______
Age: _______months

Introduction: I am writing some stories for little children. I want you to tell me if you
think little children would like these stories. I am going to read two stories to you. Then I
will ask you questions about the stories. I want you to look at the pictures and listen
carefully. If you have any questions, you can ask me.
Logical Inferencing Scenario:
Implicit False Belief: (modified from Sullivan et al., 1994)
This is a story about Pam and her Dad. Today is Pam’s birthday and she’s having
a big party tonight. Dad is surprising her with a new bike that he has hidden in the
living room. See? Here is the surprise bike. Pam and Dad are in the kitchen
talking about her birthday. Pam says, “Dad, I really want a new bike for my
birthday.” Now remember, Dad wants the bike to be a surprise, so he says,
“Sorry, I didn’t get you that. I got you roller blades instead.”
First Order Question: What does Pam think Dad got her for her birthday? (If necessary,
Fill in: Pam thinks Dad got her ____.)
2 = Correct answer without assistance.
1 = Correct answer with cloze procedure.
0 = Incorrect answer or no response.
Child’s answer: __________________________________________
Correct answer: Rollerblades
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Appendix C: (Continued)
Reality Question: What did Dad really get her for her birthday? (If necessary, Fill in:
Dad really got Pam ___.)
2 = Correct answer without assistance.
1 = Correct answer with cloze procedure.
0 = Incorrect answer or no response.
Child’s answer: __________________________________________
Correct answer: A bike.
Then Pam says to Dad, “O.K., well I’m going over to my friend’s house. I’ll be
home later. On her way out, Pam goes into the living room to get her umbrella
because it’s raining. In the living room, she finds her new bike! She thinks to
herself, “Yes! Dad did not get me roller blades. He really got me a bike. Dad
does not see Pam go into the living room and find the bike.
Linguistic Contrast Question: Does Dad know that Pam saw her bike in the living room?
2 = Correct answer without assistance.
1 = Correct answer with cloze procedure.
0 = Incorrect answer or no response.
Child’s answer: __________________________________________
Correct answer: No.
Ignorance Question: Later, Pam’s grandmother comes over for the party. Grandma asks
Dad, “Does Pam know what you got her for her birthday? What does Dad say? (If
necessary, Fill in: Dad says ____.).
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Appendix C: (Continued)
2 = Correct answer without assistance.
1 = Correct answer with cloze procedure.
0 = Incorrect answer or no response.
Child’s answer: __________________________________________
Correct answer: No.
Second Order Question: Now remember, Dad does not know that Pam saw what he got
her for her birthday. Then Grandma asks Dad, “What does Pam think you got her for her
birthday? What does Dad say? (If necessary, Fill in: Dad says, “Pam thinks I got her
___.”).
2 = Correct answer without assistance.
1 = Correct answer with cloze procedure.
0 = Incorrect answer or no response.
Child’s answer: __________________________________________
Correct answer: Rollerblades.
Justification Question: Why does Dad say that?
2 = Correct answer without assistance.
1 = Correct answer with cloze procedure.
0 = Incorrect answer or no response.
Child’s answer: __________________________________________
Correct answer: Because he doesn’t know that Pam saw the bike.
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Appendix C: (Continued)
Social Inferencing Task:
Implicit False-Belief:
This is a story about Frank and his Dad. Today is Frank’s birthday. Frank wants
to go to a baseball game for his birthday. He does not want a surprise party for his
birthday. Frank hates surprise parties. He gets embarrassed when everyone looks
at him and yells, “Surprise!” Frank’s Dad is giving him a surprise birthday party.
Dad bought Frank balloons and a birthday cake and hid them in the living room.
Dad does not know that Frank gets embarrassed at surprise parties. Dad thinks
Frank would be glad to have a surprise party. Frank and Dad are in the kitchen
talking about his birthday. Frank says, “Dad I really want to go to a baseball game
for my birthday.” Now remember, Dad wants the party to be a surprise, so he
says, “Frank, that’s a good idea. I will think about it.”
First Order Question: What does Frank hope that Dad will do for his birthday? (If
necessary, Fill-in: Frank hopes that Dad will _____).
2 = Correct answer without assistance.
1 = Correct answer with cloze procedure.
0 = Incorrect answer or no response.
Child’s answer: __________________________________________
Correct answer: He hopes he will take him to a baseball game.
Reality Question: What did Dad really do for Frank’s birthday? (If incorrect, say: “But
remember, Dad wants to surprise Frank with the party.” If necessary, Fill-in: Dad really
____).
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2 = Correct answer without assistance.
1 = Correct answer with cloze procedure.
0 = Incorrect answer or no response.
Child’s answer: __________________________________________
Correct answer: He is going to throw him a surprise party.
Then Frank says to Dad, “Great, I’m going to tell my friend next door, I’ll be
home later.” On his way out, Frank sees the balloons and cake hidden in the living
room. He thinks, “Oh no! Dad is giving me a surprise party; we are not going to
the baseball game.” Remember, Dad does not see Frank go into the living room
and find the balloons and cake.
Linguistic Contrast Question: Does Dad know that Frank is disappointed? (If necessary,
Fill in: n/a).
2 = Correct answer without assistance.
1 = Correct answer with cloze procedure.
0 = Incorrect answer or no response.
Child’s answer: __________________________________________
Correct answer: No.
Ignorance Question: Later, Frank’s grandmother comes over for the party. Grandma asks
Dad, “Does Frank like surprise parties?” What does Dad say? (If necessary, Fill-in: Dad
says__).
2 = Correct answer without assistance.
1 = Correct answer with cloze procedure.
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0 = Incorrect answer or no response.
Child’s answer: __________________________________________
Correct answer: Yes.
Second Order Question: Now remember, Dad does not know that Frank gets embarrassed
at surprise parties. Then Grandma asks Dad, “How will Frank feel about having a
surprise party?” What does Dad say? (If necessary, Fill-in: Frank will be ____).
2 = Correct answer without assistance.
1 = Correct answer with cloze procedure.
0 = Incorrect answer or no response.
Child’s answer: __________________________________________
Correct answer: He will like it.
Justification Question: Why does Dad say that?
2 = Correct answer without assistance.
1 = Correct answer with cloze procedure.
0 = Incorrect answer or no response.
Child’s answer: __________________________________________
Correct answer: Dad does not know that Frank gets embarrassed at surprise parties.
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Appendix D: List of Priming Verbs
Mental State Verbs

Action Verbs

Think

Run

Know

Play

Guess

Swim

Understand

Fall

Decide

Eat

Notice

Jump

Concentrate

Walk

Study

Hit

Communication Verbs

Action Verbs

Explain

Climb

Question

Crawl

Complain

Cut

Demand

Draw

Beg

Push

Remind

Brush

Promise

Ride

Discuss

Drive
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Appendix E: Episode Analysis of Frog Goes to Dinner
Episode 1
The boy is in his bedroom getting dressed for dinner.
He hears the frog croak.
He gets the frog out of the drawer.
He hears the car horn honk and runs out of the room.
He comes back for the frog and puts him in his pocket.
He leaves in the car with his mom and dad.
Episode 2
They arrive at the restaurant.
The valet is waiting to park the car.
The frog croaks, and the valet hears him.
The boy and the valet look at each other.
The boy looks surprised and scared.
He is afraid the valet will say something.
He runs into the restaurant after his mom and dad.
Episode 3
The boy and his parents are sitting in the restaurant looking at menus.
The frog jumps out of the boy’s pocket, but the boy doesn’t know it.
A band is playing music.
The frog climbs up on the stage and jumps into the saxophone.
The musician blows the saxophone, and the frog flies out.
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He lands in the lobster tank.
Episode 4
The boy checks his pocket and realizes the frog is gone.
He looks worried.
His parents are still looking at the menus.
He sneaks under the table and goes to look for the frog.
Episode 5
The frog swims to the side of the tank and is trying to get out.
A lobster is swimming toward him with his pincers out.
Will the frog get out in time?
He climbs out of the tank before the lobster gets him.
Episode 6
The frog jumps into a bowl of salad.
The waiter serves the salad to a couple at the table.
They look hungry.
They start eating the salad, and they like it.
Then the lady finds the frog in her salad.
She looks up and appears shocked.
When she looks down again, the frog is gone.
Then she sees the frog on the man’s head.
She looks horrified and points to the man’s head.
The man gets excited and tries to get the frog off his head.
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The frog jumps in a water pitcher that a waiter is carrying.
The man’s toupee flies into a lady’s soup bowl at another table.
The lady at the other table looks surprised.
The couple with the salad run out of the restaurant.
Episode 7
The waiter does not see the frog in the water pitcher.
He pours the frog into a water glass at a table where a man and a woman are holding
hands.
The couple at the table get mad and leave the restaurant.
Episode 8
The boy’s parents look up from their menus and realize he is missing.
They look concerned.
The boy is still searching for the frog.
Episode 9
The frog jumps on a souffle being served at a table.
The souffle collapses.
The people at the table see the frog and look disgusted.
The frog jumps onto a tray of dirty dishes.
Episode 10
The dishwasher sees the frog in the kitchen on a plate.
He catches the frog under a bowl.
He can’t figure out which bowl the frog is under.
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The frog is still under a bowl and is getting away.
The dishwasher tries to catch him.
The pastry chef trips over him and falls into a cake.
A waiter comes into the kitchen and also trips, dropping his tray.
Another waiter sees the chaos and decides not to go into the kitchen.
Abbreviated Episode 11
The boy’s parents are still walking around the restaurant and looking for the boy.
They appear worried.
Episode 12
The cook sees the big mess in the kitchen and then sees the frog.
The cook looks really mad.
He catches the frog and looks at him.
He holds up a big knife.
The boy runs in and yells, “Stop!”
Episode 13
The boy and his parents arrive at home.
The boy is worried that he is in trouble.
The boy goes upstairs.
The parents look at each other and start to laugh.
The boy turns around and sees his parents laughing.
He knows he is not in trouble.
The boy is in his room and starts to laugh, too.
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Appendix F: Description of the Eight Still Frames
Frame 1
The boy comes back to his room to get his frog.
Frame 2
The valet hears the frog croak and looks questioningly at the boy.
Frame 3
The frog is about to jump out of the boy’s pocket unknown to the boy.
Frame 4
The boy sneaks under the table to look for the frog.
Frame 5
A woman is staring at the frog on a man’s head and looks horrified.
Frame 6
The dishwasher catches the frog under a bowl.
Frame 7
The boy’s parents are looking for him and appear worried.
Frame 8
The parents look at each other and start to laugh.
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Appendix G: Consent Form
1. General Information of the Research Study:
Your child is invited to participate in a research study called “Talking and Writing about
Thinking: Children’s Use of Special Meanings.” Children use special words to talk and
write about thinking, for example, think, know, guess, remember, want to, mean to, and
can. Children learn that other people also think in these ways. This is when children learn
to see other people’s points of view. Our purpose is to see if 9- and 11-year children
differ in their ability to use these types of words when talking or writing. This study is
being conducted by faculty and students in the Department of Communication Sciences
and Disorders at the University of South Florida (USF). Your county’s school district and
the administrators and teachers at your child’s school have allowed us to do this study.
We are asking for permission to include your child. We hope to have 100 children in
grades 4 and 6 participate in the study.
2. Description of the Research Study:
This study will include 9-year-old and 11-year-old children. The initial part of the study
will consist of a hearing screening and administration of a general vocabulary test. Two
tasks that draw on children’s ability to reason about physical and social consequences
will also be administered. These tasks require understanding of other people’s beliefs,
including false beliefs. The children will then be shown a 12-minute film, Frog Goes to
Dinner. The children will be asked to talk and write about the events in the film, focusing
on the thoughts and feelings of the characters. Children find this type of activity to be
fun. Testing will be accomplished in two sessions no longer than 45 minutes each.
3. Benefits of the Study:
The results of this study will help educators by leading to a better understanding of how
oral language skills relate to reading and writing abilities. Story telling and reading
comprehension often require the ability to take other perspectives or points of view. We
assume that, if a child is able to understand the perspectives of different characters in a
story, there will be a corresponding increase in reading comprehension. This study is the
first step of further research that will benefit children who are struggling with reading and
writing.
4. Volunteering for the Study:
Your decision to allow your child to participate in this research study is completely
voluntary. You are free to allow your child to participate in this research study or to
withdraw him/her at any time. If you choose not to allow your child to participate, or if
you withdraw him/her, there will be no penalty to you or your child. Neither refusal to
participate nor the results obtained from the study will in any way affect your child
grades or eligibility for a special program in Hillsborough County. You or your child will
not be paid or receive special considerations for participation in this study. There are no
known risks to participants.
5. Confidentiality of Your Child’s Records:
During this study, all students will be videotaped and audiotaped; however, all
videotapes, audiotapes, and test results will be kept confidential to the extent of the law.
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Authorized research investigators, agents of the Department of Health and Human
Services, and the USF Institutional Review Board may inspect records from this project.
While the results of this study may be reported at professional meetings, published in
professional journals, or used for training graduate students in Communication Sciences
and Disorders, your child’s anonymity will be maintained. Each child’s individual data
will be coded by number without the child’s name and school. All data will be kept in a
locked language laboratory in the Department of Communication Sciences and Disorders
at the University of South Florida. The room also has an electronic security system for
additional security.
6. Instructions:
Please read and sign the consent form (printed on the back) and promptly return it to your
child teacher by ___________________. You may also return the consent form or get
additional information from Dr. Elaine Silliman at the USF Department of
Communication Sciences and Disorders. We would greatly appreciate your help in
allowing your child to be a part of this important study. If you have additional questions,
please call Dr. Silliman at (813) 974-9812. Once the study is completed, we will be
happy to provide a summary of results to any parent or guardian who requests a copy. If
you or your child have question about your child’s rights as a person who is taking part in
a research study, you or your child may contact a member of the Division of Research
Compliance of the University of South Florida at (813) 974-5638.
Child’s Name__________________
D.O.B._______________________
Teacher’s Name________________
Your Consent – By signing this form I agree that:
• I have fully read or have had read and explained to me in my native language this
informed consent form describing a research project.
• I have had the opportunity to question one of the persons in charge of this research
and have received satisfactory answers.
• I understand that I am being asked to allow my child to participate in research. I
understand the risks and benefits, and I freely give my consent to allow my child to
participate in the research project outlined in this form, under the conditions indicated on
it.
• I have been given a signed copy of this informed consent form, which is mine to
keep.
____________________________ ____________________
Signature of Parent of Participant Printed Name of Parent
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Child’s Assent Statement
The research study called Talking and Writing about Thinking has been explained to me.
I agree to be in this study.
_________________________
Signature of Child

_________________________
Printed Name of Child

____________
Date

_________________________
Signature of Parent

_________________________
Printed Name of Parent

____________
Date

_________________________
Signature of Investigator

_________________________
Printed Name of Investigator

____________
Date

_________________________
Signature of Witness

_________________________
Printed Name of Witness

____________
Date

By signing this form I agree that: Participants have been provided with adequate
information relative to the study. A phone number has been provided in case of questions.
_________________________
Signature of Investigator

_________________________
Printed Name of Investigator

____________
Date

Institutional Approval of Study and Informed Consent
This research project/study and informed consent form were reviewed and approved by
the University of South Florida Institution Review Board for the protection of human
subjects. This approval is valid until the date provided below. The board may be
contacted at (813) 974-5638.
Approval Consent Form Expiration Date: _____________
Revision Date: _____________
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Appendix I: Script for Priming Task and Narrative Task
Priming Task
Introduction 1 (mind vs. body):
“We’re going to play a game. I’m going to show you some verbs written
on cards. These verbs can express something you can do mostly with your
body or mostly with your mind. For example, you mostly use your mind to
think and you mostly use your body to run. We’re going to separate the
two kinds of verbs into two piles. One pile will be things you do mostly
with your mind, and the other pile will be things you mostly do with your
body.”
Instructions 1: “Now it’s your turn. Put all the verbs you do mostly with
your mind in this pile, and all the verbs you do mostly with your body in
this pile.”
Scripted prompt 1: “Tell me if that verb is something you do mostly with
your mind or mostly with your body.”
Introduction 2 (communication vs. body):
“We’re going to play another game. I’m going to show you more verbs
written on cards. These verbs can express what you do mostly when
communicating or something you do mostly with your body. For example,
you can communicate or talk with a yell or a whisper and you can use
your body to crawl. We’re going to separate the two kinds of verbs into
two piles. One pile will be things you do mostly when you are
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communicating, and the other pile will be things you mostly do with your
body.”
Instructions 2: “Now it’s your turn. Put all the verbs you do mostly when
you communicate in this pile, and all the verbs about things you mostly do
with your body in this pile.”
Scripted prompt 2: “Tell me if that verb is something you do mostly when
you communicate or mostly with your body.”
Narrative Task
Introduction: “I’m writing a book and need some help coming up with a
good story to go with the video I’m going to show you. This video has
many different characters. There is a boy, a frog, a mom, a dad, a cook, a
waiter, and some other people. Your teacher told me that you’re a good
storyteller. I need you to help me make up a good story to go with the
video. You can watch the video while I do some work over here.”
Instructions: “I want you to make up the best story that you can to go with
the video. Remember that to tell/write a good story, you should talk about
what’s going on in the character’s minds. You need to say what they might
be thinking, saying, and feeling. Tell me what you think they might be
thinking, feeling, and saying. Here are some pictures from the story, to
help you remember.”
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Scripted questions (as needed):
(1) What was going on in the characters’ minds?
(2) What else could be going on in the characters’ minds?
(3) What might have this character been saying?
(4) Tell me how the characters’ are using their minds.
(5) Why do you think that character did that?
(6) How does the character feel?
(7) If I could listen to the characters talking, what would I hear?
Scripted questions for frames:
1a. What is going on in the little boy’s mind?
1b. If I could listen to the boy talk, what would I hear?
2. This is the guy that parked the car. What’s going on in his mind?
3. What’s going on in the frog’s mind?
4. What’s going on in the little boy’s mind?
5. Look at her face. What’s going on in the lady’s mind?
6. I wonder what he’s doing. What’s going on in the chef’s mind?
7a. There are the parents. What’s going on in the parents’ minds?
7b. If I could listen to the parents talking, what would I hear?
8a. What is going on in the parents’ minds?
8b. If I could listen to the parents talking, what would I hear?
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If the written narrative is not readable, the following script will be employed:
“Okay, I want to make sure that I have this right. Could you read it to me out loud
so that I can tape record it?”
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